| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | 1 |
| INTRODUCTION | 7 |
| 1. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 7 |
| 1.1 CAUGHT SHORT: THE COLLAPSE OF LEHMAN BROTHERS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES | 8 |
| 1.2 FORMULATING A EUROPEAN RESPONSE: BENELUX TAKES THE LEAD | 9 |
| 1.3 FROM ONE ELYSÉE SUMMIT TO ANOTHER | 15 |
| 1.3.1 THE FIRST ELYSÉE SUMMIT OF 4 OCTOBER 2008 | 15 |
| 1.3.2 A NEW CRISIS AT HYPO REAL ESTATE AND CONTINUING EFFORTS TO BUILD A EUROPE-WIDE CONSENSUS | 16 |
| 1.3.3 SUPER GORDON DOES HIS OWN THING | 18 |
| 1.3.4 A WASHINGTON INTERLUDE | 19 |
| 1.3.5 THE EUROGROUP SUMMIT OF 12 OCTOBER 2008 | 20 |
| 1.4 THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND ITS CONCLUSIONS (PARAGRAPHS 1-14) | 22 |
| The role of the ECB and the advantages of the euro (paragraph 2) | 23 |
| The Elysée Declaration is endorsed by the EU-27 (paragraph 3) | 24 |
| Crisis management and the debate about economic government that never took place (paragraph 6) | 25 |
| More and better regulation more effectively administered (paragraph 8 ) | 25 |
| Accountability and executive remuneration in the financial services sector (paragraph 9) | 26 |
| Growth and employment in the ‘real’ economy (paragraph 10) | 26 |
| The Stability and Growth Pact in a period of crisis (paragraph 11) | 27 |
| Towards a new international financial system (paragraph 12) | 28 |
| The EU and Iceland (paragraph 13) | 29 |
| Oil price volatility (paragraph 14) | 29 |
| 1.5 BEYOND THE OCTOBER COUNCIL: HUBRIS, DISAGREEMENT AND UNEASE | 29 |
| 1.6 THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF 7 NOVEMBER: THE FRENCH PRESIDENCY IS REINED IN | 34 |
| 1.7 A SECOND WASHINGTON INTERLUDE | 40 |
| 1.8 THE EU AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: WAITING FOR ANGELA MERKEL | 41 |
| 2. OTHER BUSINESS: LISBON, CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY SECURITY, IMMIGRATION AND RUSSIA | 45 |
| 2.1 THE TREATY OF LISBON (PARAGRAPH 15) | 45 |
| 2.2 ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE (PARAGRAPH 16) | 46 |
| 2.3 ENERGY SECURITY (PARAGRAPHS 17 AND 18) | 49 |
| 2.4 THE IMMIGRATION PACT (PARAGRAPHS 18 AND 19) | 50 |
| 2.5 FOLLOW-UP TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF 1 SEPTEMBER 2008 (PARAGRAPHS 21 AND 22) | 50 |
| 3. THE FRENCH PRESIDENCY AND THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENCY POWER | 51 |
| ENDNOTES | 53 |
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